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Abstract  
This study examined factors influencing employees’ participation in non-malicious, information systems 
security deviant behavior (N-ISSDB) (e.g., e.g., connecting computers to the Internet through an insecure 
wireless network, not disposing and destroying all unneeded sensitive documents and information on 
computer in a timely manner, and opening emails from unverified senders) from the theoretical lens of 
formal control mechanisms and formal sanctions. Empirical data was collected from 338 professionals 
based in the United States of America. Relevant hypotheses were formulated and tested using the partial 
least squares technique. The results indicate that detection control mechanism (i.e., 
evaluation/monitoring) and deterrence countermeasures or factors (i.e., punishment certainty and 
punishment severity) have negative association with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. The data did 
not show that control mechanism related to reward and specifications have meaningful roles in 
dissuading employees’ engagement in N-ISSDB.  
Keywords  
Information security, non-malicious, information systems security deviant behavior, employees, formal 
control mechanisms, formal sanctions. 
Introduction 
Over two decades, the management of information system (IS) security in organizations has received—
and continues to receive—the attention of both researchers and practitioners. Emphasizing IS security 
control has become a major concern to organizations because of considerable financial, reputation, and 
regulatory problems that can arise from a breach (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Posey et al., 2013; Ifinedo, 2015). 
A recent study sponsored by IBM reported that, on average, the cost of a breach has risen to $4 million 
per incident—up 29% since 2013 (Ponemon Institute, 2016). Organizations have since realized that 
technical security controls are not sufficient to prevent security breaches (Crossler et al., 2013). Threats to 
organizations’ information-related assets can come from both internal and external sources (Loch et al., 
1992). Oftentimes, practitioners primarily focus on external threats, such as malicious hackers who can 
cause serious damage to organizational information-related assets. However, threats that originate from 
the non-malicious actions of employees (i.e., the insider) can be as damaging (Ponemon Institute, 2012, 
2016). Past IS security research provides valuable insights and broad understanding of factors influencing 
compliance and non-compliance of IS security policies and guidelines (Herath and Rao, 2009; Son, 2011; 
Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Ifinedo, 2014) and general misuse of IS resources (Ng et al., 2009; D’Arcy et al., 
2009). That noted, research on employees’ participation in benign or non-malicious IS security behavior 
is not well represented in the literature (e.g., Guo et al., 2011; Posey et al., 2013; Chu and Chau, 2014). 
This current study is designed to fill this lacuna. 
First and foremost, we concur with espoused viewpoints indicating that malicious and non-malicious IS 
security behaviors differ and should not be conflated (Loch et al., 1992). Second, the commonly used 
 Factors Influencing Employees’ Participation in Non-Malicious, Security Deviant Behavior 
  
 Twenty-third Americas Conference on Information Systems, Boston, 2017 2 
dependent variable in prior IS security studies tends to be “intention to comply (or not comply) with IS 
policy” (Crossler et al., 2013; Ifinedo, 2014). In this study, participants’ self-reported participation in 
exemplars of non-malicious IS security behaviors is used as the dependent variable. To investigate 
employees’ misuse of IS resources, previous IS security studies utilized a variety of frameworks, including 
psychological control-related motivations (e.g., self-efficacy, response efficacy, psychological reactance, 
perceived identity match, moral beliefs) to explicate employees' compliance with IS security policy 
(Herath and Rao, 2009; Moody and Siponen, 2013; Siponen et al., 2014). Other perspectives need to be 
considered to ensure desired outcomes. To that end, some researchers have used formal and informal 
control mechanisms, formal sanctions, and other relevant contextual variables such as organizational 
commitment (D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009; Boss et al., 2009; D'Arcy and Devaraj, 2012).  
Researchers have demonstrated that formal control mechanisms and formal sanctions are appropriate 
lens through which employee compliance with desired IS security behavior can be examined (Straub, 
1990; Siponen and Vance, 2010; Liang et al., 2013; Hsu et al., 2015). Particularly, IS security researchers 
have shown that formal control mechanisms, such as specification, evaluation, and reward (Boss et al. 
2009; Hsu et al., 2015), and formal sanctions, including, punishment certainty and severity (Herath and 
Rao, 2009; D’Arcy et al., 2009; D'Arcy and Devaraj, 2012), are major drivers of behavioral change with 
respect employees’ compliance with acceptable organizational IS security guidelines and rules. The 
literature benefits from our effort that seeks to integrate both formal control mechanisms and formal 
sanctions in this study. Thus, this study’s main purpose is to add to the knowledge of factors likely to curb 
or diminish employees’ participation in non-malicious, information systems security deviant behavior (N-
ISSDB) in work settings. Here, N-ISSDB refers to sanctioned practices related to the volitional use of 
computing technologies and general IS security misbehaviors that are contrary to the legitimate interests 
of an organization. N-ISSDB encapsulates deviant computer-related misbehaviors with benign intentions 
(e.g., opening emails from unverified senders, and using generic and unencrypted USBs on an 
organization’s network) and does not include unintentional actions such as accidental data entry or 
intentional malicious IS security malpractices (e.g., data sabotage and theft) (Loch et al., 1992). Following 
the preceding discussions, the research questions posed in this study are presented as follows:  
Q1: What effect do formal control mechanisms (i.e., specification, evaluation/monitoring, and reward) 
have on employees’ participation in N-ISSDB?  
Q2: What effect do formal sanctions (i.e., punishment certainty and punishment severity) have on 
employees’ participation in N-ISSDB? 
Background Information 
The study of employees’ misuse of IS resources in work environments, in general, and engagement in non-
malicious N-ISSDB, in particular, is nascent (Weatherbee, 2010; Guo et al., 2011; Posey et al., 2013; Chu 
and Chau, 2014). In fact, Guo et al. (2011) were among the first IS researchers to draw attention to N-
ISSDB. These researchers showed that perceived identity match and attitude toward non-malicious 
security violations, among others, affected individuals’ willingness to engage in such behaviors. 
Researchers, such as Posey et al. (2013) and Chu and Chau (2014), have attempted to identify and 
categorize employees’ non-malicious IS security risk behaviors. In studying aspects of non-malicious N-
ISSDB, some researchers have based their work on sub-elements of the phenomenon. For example, 
Moody and Siponen (2013) investigated non-work-related personal use of the internet at work; they found 
that employees’ habit, self-concept, personal beliefs, and attitude are strong impetuses. Various 
taxonomies of individual IS security behaviors have been suggested (e.g., Loch et al., 1992; Stanton et al., 
2005). We draw mainly from Loch et al. (1992) who identified sources of information security threats to 
an organization, and Stanton et al. (2005) who proposed a taxonomy of end-user security risk behaviors. 
The latter categorized IS security threats as either malicious or non-malicious. It is worth noting that our 
concept of N-ISSDB compares with Weatherbee’s (2010) counterproductive technology use behavior and 
Chu and Chau’s (2014) information security deviant behavior.  
For the purposes of this study, we utilized an illustrative list of commonly practiced N-ISSDB (see Table 1) 
sourced from practitioners’ reports and academicians’ studies (Ng et al., 2009; Guo et al., 2011; Moody 
and Siponen, 2013; Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 2015; Chu and Chau, 2014; Ponemon Institute, 2012, 2016). 
Six experts' opinions (i.e., 3 IS professors and 3 IS security professionals) were sought in selecting the 10 
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N-ISSDB items used for the study. These experts were given lists of N-ISSDB items referenced in the 
aforementioned academic studies and practitioner’s reports. They were then asked to select any 10 items 
from the lists that depicted, in their views, behaviors that employees frequently participate in. We collated 
their responses. In brief, N-ISSDB items #1 - #5, # 9 and #10 (Table 1) came from Guo et al. (2011) and 
Ponemon Institute (2012, 2016). Items #7 and #8 were taken from Ng et al. (2009), Blue Coat Systems, 
Inc. (2015); and #6 was sourced from Chu and Chau (2014). Recent academic studies in the area (e.g., 
Posey et al., 2013) also show that the selected N-ISSDB items are indeed prevalent in organizations. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
Organizational control theory (OCT) describes management mechanisms through which an organization 
manages and directs the attention of its members, as well as motivates and encourages them to act in 
accordance with its goals and objectives (Eisenhardt 1989; Ouchi 1979). Organizational control is 
comprised of two underlying perspectives: formal and informal control (Ouchi 1979). We focused on 
formal control in this study for illustration purposes and because past studies have used informal control 
mechanisms in comparable studies (e.g., Siponen and Vance, 2010). Formal control is concerned 
specifying acceptable standards and practices, monitoring and evaluating desired performance outcomes, 
and rewarding compliance (Eisenhardt 1985; Kirsch, 1997). Against this backdrop, IS security researchers 
(Boss et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2015) have used control mechanisms, i.e., specification, 
evaluation/monitoring, and reward to investigate workers’ compliance with desired IS security behaviors 
and practices. Some researchers have realized the inadequacies of scoping the discourse of formal controls 
to only positive incentives, i.e., reward (Boss et al. 2009; Liang et al., 2013). For example, Liang et al. 
(2013) argued that other actions to reduce noncompliance should also be emphasized. Accordingly, we 
include in our study another control strategy often used by organizations to encourage desired behaviors 
and discourage undesired behaviors: threat of sanctions or punishment (e.g., Trevino, 1992). In fact, 
many IS security researchers (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Son, 2011) have used perceived certainty and severity of 
sanctions, which are derived from deterrence theory (Tittle, 1980), to represent formal sanctions in their 
studies. Deterrence theory proposes that unacceptable behavior decreases as punishment certainty and 
punishment severity increases.  
Research Model and Hypotheses Formulation 
The research model, which includes relevant control variables, is shown in (Figure 1). We followed criteria 
for classifying variables as formative and reflective constructs (please see, for example, D'Arcy and 
Devaraj, 2012). Discussions on the study’s hypotheses are provided as follows:  
Specification refers to formal documented procedures or statements which articulate desired behaviors or 
outcomes (Kirsch, 1997; Boss et al., 2009). Specified documents are designed to regulate the behaviors of 
individuals toward achieving or preventing a particular outcome (Eisenhardt, 1985). Organizational IS 
security policy is an example of a formal document used to control employees’ behaviors (Herath and Rao, 
2009; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Son, 2011). Where IS policies are clearly written or specified and employees 
are aware of their organization’s expectations, workers tend to be more cautious about protecting their 
organizational digital assets than in contexts where such rules are not specified or lacking (e.g., Bulgurcu 
et al., 2010; Ponemon Institute, 2012, 2016). The specification of an IS security policy essentially directs 
employees’ behaviors toward desired IS security practices. For example, an IS security policy might state, 
“Employees should avoid reusing the same passwords for all visited websites.” Thus, we predict that: 
H1: Specification of IS security policies and rules will be negatively associated with employees’ 
participation in N-ISSDB. 
Evaluation/monitoring relates to observing and checking individuals’ compliance with specified behaviors 
or outcomes (Boss et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2012). It may include checking employees’ Internet use 
patterns and conducting IS security audits (Herath and Rao, 2009). D’Arcy et al. (2009) noted that 
monitoring is a detection mechanism which is not the same as a deterrence security countermeasure (this 
will be discussed later). The availability of an IS security policy or guidelines in an organization is not a 
guarantee that employees will comply with such rules (Siponen and Vance, 2010); enforcing those rules 
through evaluation/monitoring of workers’ IS security practices and activities is necessary (D’Arcy et al., 
2009; Chen et al., 2012). If employees believe that management does not monitor or evaluate their 
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computing practices (and their use of technologies at work), they are more likely to flout guidelines and 
directives specified in their organizations’ IS security policies. D’Arcy et al. (2009) found that when 
employees know that computer monitoring is in place, incidents of IS misuse drop significantly. Thus, we 
predict that: 
H2: Evaluation/monitoring employees’ computing activities will be negatively associated with their 
participation in N-ISSDB. 
Reward refers to tangible or intangible compensation that an organization gives to an employee in return 
for compliance with acceptable behavior (Eisenhardt, 1985; Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Generally, a reward is 
given in recognition of an individual’s effort or achievement. Rewards may include monetary or 
nonmonetary awards, recognition, praise, and so on. Boss et al. (2009) commented that “If policies are 
stated, data gathered, individuals evaluated, but there is no reward for either compliance or lack of a 
reward for non-compliance, individuals will soon decide that the policy is unimportant” (p. 154). Bulgurcu 
et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2012) evidenced the significance of reward as an important antecedent to IS 
security policy compliance. Siponen et al. (2014) found that reward is negatively related to actual 
compliance with IS policies. Thus, employee participation in non-malicious N-ISSDB is likely to be low 
where reward is available to induce adherence with acceptable behaviors. Thus, we predict that: 
H3: Reward will be negatively associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Research Model 
Punishment certainty refers to the likelihood of being punished (Tittle, 1980). Punishment severity refers 
to the magnitude of the punishment (Tittle, 1980). Both are deterrence countermeasures. Criminology 
literature shows that if an individual knows that s/he is going to be caught and severely penalized for 
engaging in an undesired behavior, the desire to participate in such tends to be low (Tittle, 1980). It is 
argued that monitoring/evaluation is a detection control mechanism and not a tool of deterrence, per se 
(D’Arcy et al., 2009). An employee may be aware of detection controls deployed in their organizations and 
employ various techniques to circumvent or evade such controls (Ponemon 2012; Siponen and Vance, 
2010). However, when deterrence countermeasures are in place, individuals know there are severe 
consequences for their actions to deter future engagements in unsanctioned behaviors. Broadly, IS 
security literature shows that deterrence measures are a useful control mechanism for reducing IS 
resources misuse (e.g., Straub, 1990; D’Arcy et al., 2009; D’Arcy and Hovav, 2012). For example, D’Arcy 
et al. (2009) found that perceived severity of sanctions had a significant negative effect on IS misuse 
intention. Thus, it is expected that employee participation in N-ISSDB will be low where formal sanctions 
related to perceived certainty and severity are in place. Thus, we predict that: 
H4: Punishment certainty will be negatively associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. 
H5: Punishment severity will be negatively associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. 
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Research Methodology 
Study Design and Procedure 
A field survey was used to validate the research model. Pre-test and pilot surveys were conducted to 
enhance the content and face validities of the measuring items used. We used the services of a market 
research firm to collect data from panelists. Other IS researchers (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010) used the 
same approach for data collection perhaps to circumvent difficulty in obtaining information-security 
information from organizations. Full-time employees of organizations were targeted by the company. 
Panelists were notified of the purpose of the study and participation was voluntary. The research company 
invited 594 panelists to participate in the study and 392 responded (66%). Incomplete responses and 
poorly completed responses were excluded from subsequent data analysis. In all, 338 responses were used 
for the study to give an effective response rate of 56.9%.  
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
Both sexes are represented in the sample; 176 are males (52%) and 161 are females (48%) with many of 
them having bachelor (50%) and post-graduate degrees (23%). In the sample, 29.9%, 40.2%, and 14.1% of 
respondents were in the 21 to 30, 31 to 40, and 41 to 50 age ranges, respectively. The participants’ average 
years of computer use is 20.7 years (standard deviations [S.D.] = 40.9) and they have 3.2 years (S.D. = 
1.2) tenure at their current organizations. The sample has 144 IT professionals (42.6%) and 189 non-IT 
professionals (55.9%). The data has a few missing cases. Some of the participants’ job titles include 
operations manager, project manager, accountant, IT manager, and senior IT analyst. Diverse industries, 
such as IT, manufacturing, retail, and healthcare, were included in the sample. The data sample includes 
an even distribution of organization size and annual revenue. 77 (22.8%) respondents are from 
organizations with less than 100 employees and 69 (20.4%) participants are from organizations with 2500 
workers and above. Given the survey data collected both independent and dependent data from the same 
source, common method bias (CMB) cannot be ruled out. Procedural remedies recommended by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to reduce the effects of CMB were followed. Namely, respondent anonymity was 
assured by our effort to use a research data company to collect data on our behalf; this exercise reduces 
apprehension. Survey questions were ordered in a randomized manner. In addition to noted preventive 
measures, we conducted two post-hoc statistical analyses to further reduce concerns related to the 
presence of common method bias. First, a Harman’s one-factor test was conducted for the reflective 
constructs. The results showed that the first factor explained 36.6% of the variance. Second, Pavlou et al.’s 
(2007) suggest that an inter-construct correlation higher than 0.9 is a possible indicator of common 
method bias. There were no correlations in Table 3 above 0.90 to further show CMB was not a problem to 
our data. Both tests indicated that CMB was not problematic for the collected data. 
Operationalization of the Constructs 
As already indicated, items used to represent the N-ISSDB construct (see Table 1) were taken from the 
following sources:  Ng et al. (2009), Chu and Chau (2014), Blue Coat Systems, Inc. (2015), Guo et al. 
(2011), Ponemon Institute (2012, 2016). The study’s participants were asked the question: “Please 
indicate how often you participate in the N-ISSDB listed [in Table 1].” Their responses were assessed on a 
seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Almost never” (1) to “Almost always” (7). Items used to 
operationalize specification, evaluation/monitoring, and reward were adapted from Boss et al. (2009) and 
Hsu et al. (2015). Punishment certainty and punishment severity were operationalized with items taken 
from Herath and Rao (2009), D’Arcy and Devaraj (2012), and Son (2011). The measuring items used for 
the reflective constructs were assessed on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” (1) 
to “Strongly agree” (7). Table 2 shows the questionnaire items (reflective constructs) and their descriptive 
statistics.  
Item 
no. 
N-ISSDB Item 
Mean SD Weight 
P 
value 
VIF 
#1 
Not immediately notifying your organization of 
the loss of IT resources (e.g., USB) containing 
confidential data 
3.16 2.32 0.169 <0.001 2.518 
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#2 
Connecting computers to the Internet through an 
insecure wireless network 
3.41 2.27 0.178 <0.001 2.810 
#3 
Reusing the same password and username on 
different websites    
4.17 2.12 0.176 <0.001 2.777 
#4 
Using generic and unencrypted USB on 
organization’s network  
3.52 2.21 0.127 0.009 3.959+ 
#5 
Using personal mobile devices to connect to 
organization’s network 
3.84 2.22 0.167 <0.001 2.072 
#6 Using simple passwords for convenience  3.83 2.10 0.177 <0.001 2.808 
#7 Opening emails from unverified senders   3.33 2.21 0.127 0.009 4.451+ 
#8 
Using social media sites for personal reasons at 
work 
3.67 2.22 0.171 <0.001 2.271 
#9 
Not disposing and destroying all unneeded 
sensitive documents and information on 
computer on time 
3.42 2.27 0.176 <0.001 2.512 
#10 
Carrying unnecessary sensitive information on a 
laptop when traveling  
3.33 2.25 0.126 
0.010 
3.755+ 
Note:  + = item removed from subsequent analysis; SD = Standard deviations  
Table 1. The Questionnaire’s Items, Their Descriptive Statistics and Item Loadings 
 
Construct  Item description Mean  SD Item 
loading 
Specification I am familiar with my organization’s IT security policies, 
procedures, and guidelines. 
5.63 1.30 
0.985 
I am required to know a lot of existing written procedures and 
general practices to secure my computer system. 
5.24 1.51 
0.983 
There are written rules regarding security policies and 
procedures at my organization. 
5.53 1.36 
0.994 
Evaluation/ 
monitoring 
I believe that employee computing activities are monitored by 
my organization. 
5.34 1.42 
0.959 
I believe that my organization monitors computing activities to 
ensure that employees are performing only explicitly authorized 
tasks. 
5.24 1.47 
0.984 
I believe that my organization reviews logs of employee 
computing activities on a regular basis. 
5.13 1.59 
0.906 
Reward I will receive a personal mention in oral or written reports if I 
comply with my organizational security policies and procedures. 
4.58 1.82 
0.977 
I will be given monetary or nonmonetary rewards for following 
organizational security policies and procedures. 
4.08 2.00 
0.995 
Tangible rewards are tied to whether I follow organizational 
security policies, procedures, and guidelines. 
4.18 2.02 
0.99 
Punishment 
severity 
 
If I were caught violating organizational security policies and 
procedures, I would be severely punished. 
5.31 1.47 
0.978 
My organization would take strict action against violation of its 
security policies and procedures. 
5.35 1.36 
0.99 
If I violate organizational security policies and procedures, the 
sanctions would put me in serious trouble. 
5.27 1.41 
0.972 
Punishment 
certainty 
 
If I violate organization security policies and procedures, I would 
probably be caught. 
5.32 1.42 
0.958 
I cannot easily bypass my organizational security rules and 
guidelines without being caught. 
5.13 1.54 
0.989 
The likelihood that my organization would discover violations of 
its security policies and guidelines is very high. 
5.23 
 
1.53 
 
0.992 
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Table 2. The Questionnaire’s Items, Their Descriptive Statistics and Item Loadings 
Data Analysis 
Empirical data was analyzed using the Partial Least Squares (PLS) technique. PLS was selected as it does 
impose data normality requirements (Hair et al., 2011). We used WarpPLS 5.0 to conduct PLS analysis 
because the software is capable of handling reflective and formative constructs in a model (Kock, 2015). 
PLS allows research models to be tested in two stages: the measurement and structural models.  
Analysis of the Measurement Model 
For the reflective models, we examined item reliability, composite reliability, and convergent and 
discriminant validity. To ensure item reliability, we examined the item loadings of each item on their 
respective underlying construct. Item loadings above 0.7 are recommended (Hair et al., 2011). Table 2 
shows this criterion was met. Composite reliability higher than 0.707 for each construct is preferred (Hair 
et al., 2011), and entries in Table 3 satisfy this criterion. In addition to the two foregoing criteria, 
convergent validity is assessed by the average variance extracted (AVE) by each factor exceeding the 
variance due to measurement error for that factor (i.e., it should exceed 0.50) (Fornell and Larcker, 1981, 
Hair et al., 2011). Additionally, indicators should load much higher on their hypothesized factor than on 
other factors (i.e., own-loadings are higher than cross-loadings). This condition was met but not included 
due to space consideration; however, information on AVEs is provided in Table 3. All AVEs are above the 
recommended threshold of 0.50. In assessing discriminant validity, it is recommended that a construct’s 
AVE be higher than 0.5, and the AVE’s squared root of each construct exceed its correlation coefficient 
with the other constructs in the model (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). All of the diagonal values in Table 3 
clearly exceed the correlations between any pair of factors to show that the discriminant validity criterion 
was also met. For the formative construct, it is recommended that item weights and the presence of 
multicollinearity are checked (Petter et al., 2007). Items weights show how significantly linked item 
indicators are to their specified constructs. Excessive collinearity within formative scales is undesirable as 
it can make the construct unstable. To assess multicollinearity among the variables, the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are checked. VIFs below the conservative cutoff of 3.33 are considered adequate (Petter et 
al., 2007). WarpPLS 5.0 provides information on VIF and item weights. Table 1 shows that VIFs and item 
weights used to capture N-ISSDB are adequate. All the VIFs are below 3.33 and the weights are mostly 
significant at p <0.001 level.  
  COM AVE 1 2 3 4 5 
1:  Specification  0.9 0.76 0.87 0.59 0.45 0.51 0.48 
2: Evaluation/ monitoring 0.91 0.78 0.59 0.88 0.50 0.57 0.63 
3: Reward 0.95 0.86 0.45 0.50 0.93 0.41 0.39 
4: Punishment severity 0.94 0.83 0.51 0.57 0.41 0.91 0.76 
5: Punishment certainty 0.92 0.79 0.48 0.63 0.39 0.76 0.89 
Note: a) COM = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted; b) Off-diagonal elements are 
correlations among constructs; c) the bold fonts in the leading diagonals are the square root of AVEs. 
Table 3. Composite Reliability, AVEs, and inter-construct correlations 
 Analysis of the Structural Model 
The results show that independent variables and control variables explained 24% of the variance in the 
model. Coefficient of determination (R2) of 0.2 (20%) and higher implies substantive influence (D’Arcy 
and Devaraj, 2012). WarpPLS 5.0 also provides information on Goodness of Fit (GoF), which is a global 
fit measure that accounts for both measurement and structural model performance (Tenenhaus et al., 
2005). The GoF obtained for this study is 0.42, which is above the cut-off value of 0.36 for large effect 
sizes (Wetzels et al., 2009). Inconsistent with H1, specification of IS security policies and rules was not 
found to be negatively associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB (β = -0.01, p = 0.42). The 
direction of the relationship is correct, but the path is not statistically significant.  Support was found for 
H2, which predicted that evaluation/monitoring would be negatively associated with employees’ 
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participation in N-ISSDB (β = -0.08, p < 0.05). The data did not support H3; reward was not found to be 
negatively associated with employees’ participation in non-malicious N-ISSDB (β = 0.38, p < 0.01). The 
path is statistically significant; however, the result is inconsistent with the stated prediction. Supporting 
H4 and H5, the results show that perceived certainty (β = -0.13, p < 0.05) and perceived severity (β = -
0.09, p < 0.05) are negatively associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. The data also 
showed that younger workers (β = -0.12, p <0.05) and males (β = 0.13, p <0.01) are more likely to 
participate in N-ISSDB. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Our objective was to examine the effects of formal control mechanisms and formal sanctions on 
employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. We used relevant constructs from the OCT and deterrence theory 
literature. Our study did not confirm that specification of IS security policies and rules was negatively 
associated with employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. A plausible explanation for the lack of support of H1 
might be due to extraneous factors. For example, it is possible that the sampled participants are not 
familiar with their organization’s IS security policies or such rules are not clearly documented in their 
places of work. Unfortunately, we did not collect qualitative information on such details. Nonetheless, the 
literature shows that where IS policies are in place and employees know them; they still choose to flout 
such rules (Siponen and Vance, 2010). In the context of this study, we conclude that specification of IS 
rules mattered less in dissuading participation in N-ISSDB. 
The result shows that the detection mechanism of evaluation/monitoring is important in lessening 
employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. That is, employees are less likely to participate in N-ISSDB if they 
know their computing activities and practices are being monitored and reviewed on a regular basis. This 
result supports prior studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2012) that showed evaluation/monitoring as an important 
control mechanism that can encourage employees’ compliance with desired IS security behaviors. The 
result related to the relevance of reward as a control mechanism was somewhat surprising given previous 
studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2012) that signified its pertinence. The lack of support of the prediction might be 
due to contextual influences. For example, the mean score of the three reward items (mean = 4.28, SD = 
1.95) is lower than those of the other factors’ to suggest that the sampled participants come from 
organizations where little or no incentives are given to employees for adhering to IS security policies and 
procedures. It is important to temper the foregoing statement because we did not compare views in all 
contexts, i.e., employees from contexts where rewards are awarded for compliance and otherwise. In brief, 
we conclude that reward did not influence employees’ participation in N-ISSDB in a meaningful way. 
Siponen et al. (2014) found that reward did not influence intention to comply or actual compliance with IS 
security rules. The results show that the deterrence factors of punishment certainty and severity have 
significant effect in discouraging employees’ participation in N-ISSDB. That is, employees who believe 
they would probably be caught and penalized severely for not following acceptable IS security rules and 
computing resources use practices are less likely to participate in N-ISSDB. Our results are consistent 
with prior insights in the area (e.g., D’Arcy et al., 2009; D’Arcy and Devaraj, 2012).  
Contributions to Research and Implications for Practice 
This study is one of few in the IS security research domain to focus on N-ISSDB, which has remained 
largely unexplored. We maintain that the nature of employees’ IS risk behaviors (malicious and non-
malicious) should be separated to enhance better insight in the area. Refinements along such lines 
benefits IS security research in general. Our study is one of the first to examine the effects of formal 
sanctions and formal control mechanisms on employee engagement in N-ISSDB. It is hoped that the 
information presented herein will kindle future inquiries in the area. We offer support for the applicability 
and suitability of formal sanctions and formal control mechanisms in understanding employee 
participation in N-ISSDB. Our results lend credence to prior studies emphasizing the paramount roles of 
detection mechanism and deterrence countermeasures in improving compliance with desired IS security 
behaviors in organizations (Straub, 1990; Boss et al., 2009; D’Arcy et al., 2009; Herath and Rao, 2009; 
Chen et al., 2012). Our approach of using actual end-user security behavior (be it self-reported) in lieu of 
“intention to comply” further enriches insight. Attention is drawn to the fact that specifying IS rules and 
policies may do little in discouraging participation in N-ISSDB and rules. It is more rewarding to institute 
detection and deterrence controls in order to promote desired behavioral change. Monitoring tools that 
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check workers’ daily IS use practices could be effective in modifying behavior. Trade reports document the 
rise of such technologies in organizations (e.g., Ponemon Institute, 2016). It is important that when such 
tools are deployed, caution must be exercised so as not put in place monitoring activities that backfire. 
Punishment for noncompliance should be communicated to organizational members and enforced 
accordingly when ill-sanctioned activities are detected. Regarding specification, employees should be 
given regular IS security education and training sessions to enhance their overall IS security awareness 
levels (e.g., Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Such could further impact their perceptions of rules and procedures 
provided in their organizations’ IS policies. Specified IS rules relating to N-ISSDB should be written in a 
clear, concise, and easy-to understand language to facilitate employee buy-in (e.g., Siponen et al., 2014). 
Study’s Limitations and Future Research Avenues 
There are a number of limitations in this study. First, items used to represent some of the study’s 
constructs could be improved. For example, items used to represent reward could be separated into 
monetary and nonmonetary incentives. Second, the data came from a cross-sectional field survey; 
longitudinal data may shed more light on the topic. Future studies should endeavor to overcome noted 
shortcomings in our study. The need exists for future research to use different research methods, 
including case studies, to add more insight, and for controlled experiments to be used to deepen insight 
on the nature of relationships explored in our research model. Future research should explore the effect of 
formal control mechanisms and formal sanctions on malicious ISSDB (M-ISSDB), and compare results 
with N-ISSDB.  
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